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Beyond Ebola: lessons to mitigate future pandemics
It is now just more than a year since the oﬃ  cial 
conﬁ rmation of an outbreak of Ebola haemorrhagic 
fever in west Africa.1 With new cases occurring at their 
lowest rate for 2015,2 and the end of the outbreak in 
sight for all three countries predominantly aﬀ ected, 
now is the time to consider strategies to prevent future 
outbreaks of this, and other, zoonotic pathogens. The 
Ebola outbreak, like many other emerging diseases, 
illustrates the crucial role of the ecological, social, 
political, and economic context within which diseases 
emerge. Increasing anthropogenic environmental 
changes, coupled with a globalised network of travel 
and trade, allow zoonotic pathogens to spill over into 
human beings with increasing frequency, and leave us 
supremely vulnerable to their international spread.3 
Pandemics are no longer simply the domain of public 
health and clinical medicine, but are a social issue, a 
development issue, and a global security issue. 
The cost of management of infectious disease outbreaks 
is almost always greater than the cost of avoiding them. 
For severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), the global 
cost of a single outbreak was estimated to be between 
US$13 billion and US$50 billion at the currency values of 
the 2003 outbreak.4,5 For Ebola, the cost might be higher—
both in the direct, short-term cost of control, patient care, 
and hospital admission, and in the indirect, longer-term 
dislocation of the regional economies in west Africa.6 
The economic costs of disease emergence are projected 
to continue to rise in line with increasing frequency 
of outbreaks driven by expanding socioeconomic and 
environmental changes that cause diseases to emerge.7 
Mitigation of future pandemic threats such as Ebola is 
therefore more cost-eﬀ ective than the current approach 
of responding to outbreaks after they have begun to 
spread rapidly in the human population.7
What would mitigation strategies to deal with future 
pandemic risks of zoonotic disease look like? Analyses of 
emerging disease trends during the past six decades have 
shown that Ebola ﬁ ts the dominant pattern.8 This pattern 
involves zoonotic spillover from wildlife or livestock 
driven by changes in land use, crop choices, migration 
patterns, animal husbandry, trade, transport, and travel.9 
The west African Ebola outbreak, similar to previous 
outbreaks of Ebola, HIV, SARS, inﬂ uenza, and most other 
emerging diseases, probably began with a zoonotic 
spillover from a wildlife reservoir, in this case thought to 
be bats.10 Targeted programmes for behaviour change, 
focusing on incentives for bushmeat hunting, should be 
part of the mitigation strategy. This approach was trialled 
in central Africa, with education programmes designed 
to reduce the consumption of primates found dead in 
forests, and has been shown to oﬀ er a cost-eﬀ ective way 
to mitigate the risk of an Ebola outbreak.11 Additionally, 
projects aimed to reduce dependency on bushmeat need 
to be supported, either through creative approaches 
to farming of some wildlife species, or by expansion of 
livestock production, with appropriate biosecurity and 
surveillance to prevent emergence of other zoonoses.
The acceleration of vaccine development for Ebola 
as part of an outbreak control strategy could also have 
a crucial role to mitigate future outbreaks. Ebola’s 
propensity for nosocomial spread (noted in west Africa 
and in many previous Ebola outbreaks) could be curtailed 
by preoutbreak vaccination of critical care workers in 
Ebola virus hotspots. Likewise, targeted training in 
infection control, and eﬀ orts to maintain surge capacity 
between outbreaks, will be crucial for rapid response to 
the ﬁ rst cases in a future emergence event.
Can these approaches be scaled up to mitigate 
future pandemics on a global scale? Global mitigation 
of future pandemic risk must focus on the large-
scale behaviours that lead to zoonotic spillovers. This 
approach means engaging with the sectors that drive 
disease emergence, including industries involved 
in land-use change, resource extraction, livestock 
production, travel, and trade, among others. Large 
economic development programmes will need health-
impact assessments that deal explicitly with the risk of 
emergence of novel diseases, and plans to set up new 
clinics and surveillance programmes listed as  project 
deliverables. An improved understanding of the liability 
for disease emergence will drive this change; when all 
are at risk, collective action is needed to strengthen 
the weakest links in the chain.12,13 Although existing 
multilateral agreements (eg, the International Health 
Regulations) allow for some coordination of national 
responses to outbreaks and bilateral interventions to 
build public health capacity in poor countries, more is 
needed. Collective investment needs to occur through 
a mechanism similar to the Global Environment Facility, 
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not just in local public health infrastructure, but also in 
so-called one health measures to reduce the likelihood 
of zoonotic spillovers. Management of future risk will 
need anticipation of the origin and spread of diseases 
through improved predictive models of emergence that 
include animal populations, the powerful new drivers 
of global trade and travel, and the eﬀ ect of disparities 
in income and wealth on health infrastructure, 
risk mitigation, presymptomatic diagnosis, and 
vaccination.14,15 
Perhaps the biggest challenge is that the identity of 
future emerging diseases will often be unknown before 
emergence (eg, as in SARS and HIV). Is it possible to 
design a strategy for an as-yet unknown pathogen? 
This task seems daunting, but it has already begun, 
partly though reduction of the size of the problem 
and allocation of resources in an objective way to the 
locations most at risk. Analysis of trends in disease 
emergence provides a strategy to identify the places 
most likely to propagate the next pandemic.3 These 
hotspots for disease emergence tend to be tropical 
regions with high wildlife diversity that harbour 
known or unknown zoonoses, and high levels of 
socioeconomic and environmental change.3 USAID’s 
Emerging Pandemic Threats (PREDICT) programme 
targets these hotspots to identify known and 
previously unknown viruses in wildlife species known 
to be zoonotic reservoirs, analyses patterns of high-risk 
human behaviour, tests people for evidence of these 
viruses moving across the species barrier, and enables 
the design of strategies to reduce the risk of even the 
ﬁ rst spillover event.8 Identiﬁ cation of the next Ebola 
virus, or the next HIV, will not be a simple task, but 
estimates of the diversity of viruses existing on the 
planet show that it is not impossible.16 Surely this threat 
is worth concerted eﬀ ort, given the human tragedy and 
economic devastation when pandemics strike.
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